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Abstract
In this paper, a privacy-preserving smart IoT-based healthcare big data storage system
with self-adaptive access control is proposed. The aim is to ensure the security of pa-
tients’ healthcare data, realize access control for normal and emergency scenarios, and
support smart deduplication to save the storage space in big data storage system. The
medical files generated by the healthcare IoT network are encrypted and transferred
to the storage system, which can be securely shared among the healthcare staff from
different medical domains leveraging a cross-domain access control policy. The tradi-
tional access control technology allows the authorized data users to decrypt patient’s
sensitive medical data, but also hampers the first-aid treatment when the patient’s life
is threatened because the on-site first-aid personnel are not permitted to get patient’s
historical medical data. To deal with this dilemma, we propose a secure system to de-
vise a novel two-fold access control mechanism, which is self-adaptive for both normal
and emergency situations. In normal application, the healthcare staff with proper at-
tribute secret keys can have the data access privilege; in emergency application, patien-
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t’s historical medical data can be recovered using a password-based break-glass access
mechanism. To save the storage overhead in the big data storage system, a secure d-
eduplication method is designed to eliminate the duplicate medical files with identical
data, which may be encrypted with different access policies. A highlight of this smart
secure deduplication method is that the remaining medical file after the deduplication
can be accessed by all the data users authorized by the different original access policies.
This smart healthcare big data storage system is formally proved secure, and extensive
comparison and simulations demonstrate its efficiency.
Keywords: privacy-preserving, healthcare big data storage, internet-of-things,
self-adaptive access control, smart deduplication
1. Introduction
The development of Internet of Things (IoT) technology [1] makes it possible for
the medical institutes to provide high-quality, convenient and pervasive healthcare ser-
vices. A collection of tiny wireless sensor nodes can be implanted into (or adhere on
the surface of) the patient to monitor the health condition and collect the vital phys-
iological data, which are helpful for both emergency medical decisions and chronic
disease detection [12, 32]. The elderly people can use wearable or implanted medi-
cal sensors to access modern medical services anywhere and anytime to improve their
quality of life.
When the physiological data is collected by the medical IoT network, it is transmit-
ted to the healthcare big data center for storage and disease diagnosis. To protect the
privacy of patients, the medical file needs to be encrypted before the transmission to
prevent the eavesdropping on the public domains. The patient enforces access policy
on the protected data to define the authorized attributes and the relationships. Only the
users (such as the physician, nurses, anesthetist or the family of the patients) with the
proper attribute secret keys have the privilege to decrypt the ciphertext. This encryption
method is called attribute-based encryption [33].
In modern medical system, a patient with unknown symptoms may be diagnosed
and treated in several hospitals with different medical records stored. Hence, it be-
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comes necessary to realize cross-domain secure data sharing system to facilitate the
patient’s treatment among different hospitals. For example, the examination report
produced by hospital A can be accessed by the doctors in hospital B. The encrypted
medical files generated by different hospitals are sent to the public clouds for storage
and pervasive data access [9, 10]. The patient defines the cross-domain access policy
for his protected healthcare records. Each medical staff registers to his/her medical
institute to get the attribute secret key, which is utilized to decrypt patient’s encrypted
files.
The emergency situations may occur in medical systems, for instance, a car acci-
dent happens or the patient suddenly faints. In these emergency scenarios, the electron-
ic medical records of the patents are urgently demanded to save their lives. However,
the ambulance personnel at the scene often do not have the permission to access the
encrypted medical files. In this situation, the security mechanism to protect the data
privacy may hinder the emergency rescue of the patient’s life. Therefore, it is crucial to
design a break-glass access method for the ambulance personnel to access to the elec-
tronic medical files even though they do not have the related attribute secret key. At
the same time, the break-glass access method should be manageable and accountable
to prevent malicious data access by the attacker.
In addition to these security protection concerns, the same healthcare data may be
encrypted by different medical staff using different access policies in the healthcare
big data storage system. These ciphertext are simultaneously outsourced to the public
cloud, which can occupy a huge storage space. In order to save storage space and
transfer overhead, an effective way is to eliminate the redundant ciphertext of the same
message in the big data storage system, which is called deduplication.
1.1. Our Contributions
To deal with the above security concerns, we propose a privacy-preserving health-
care big data storage and self-adaptive access control system with smart deduplication.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Smart cross-domain data sharing: In real application, patients may belong to
different medical institutes (such as different hospitals and clinics). The system
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is divided into several medical domains according to the medical institutes and
supports that the encrypted health files of a patient from medical institute MI1
can be securely shared among the healthcare medics or researchers from med-
ical institutes (MI1, · · · ,MIn). Patients’ medical records are encrypted using
attribute-based encryption with a cross-domain access policy, so that it can be
access by the authorized users in the entire system.
• Smart self-adaptive access control: The access control mechanism in this system
is self-adaptive to normal and emergency situations. The patients and healthcare
staff register to their own medical domain and get the attribute secret keys, which
can be used in normal circumstances to access patients’ encrypted files. In emer-
gency situations, a break-glass access methodology is designed so that all the
historical medical files of a patient can be recovered by a password-based break-
glass key.
• Smart deduplication: This system supports smart deduplication over attribute-
based encrypted data to save the storage space and reduce the transfer cost be-
tween the public cloud and data users, which has three phases. Firstly, we can
test whether the ciphertext is a valid one. Next, we can test whether the cipher-
texts contains identical medical file. Lastly, the ciphertext is re-encrypted using
a combined access policy such that all the original defined authorized users of
the original ciphertexts can access the encrypted data. During the deduplication
process, no plaintext message is leaked to the public clouds.
• Simulation and security: This system is comprehensively compared with the
other related schemes. We also conduct simulations of these schemes on modern
test-bed to test the performance. The comparison and simulation results indicate
that our system achieves versatile useful functions and our proposed work is
efficient in terms of the storage and computation costs. This system is validated





In 2009, Brucker et al. [6] developed an access control model with break-glass to
prevent system stagnation that may lead to loss of life, and a security architecture sup-
porting break-glass. Later, they integrated break-glass mechanism into attribute based
encryption scheme [7] to enable secure logging, which could be used to analyze the
users’ behaviors during the break-glass access process. Marinovic et al. [24] presented
a new break-glass model named Rampole, which could put integrity constraint into the
decision process so that a policy maker can manage the break-glass access authority
in a fine-grained manner. Maw et al. [25] proposed a break-glass access model for
the health care system with wireless sensor network, which considered the enforce-
ment of access permissions across medical domains. However, these research papers
[6, 7, 24, 25] only present the architectures rather than the concrete scheme. In 2016,
Zhang et al. [35] suggested a password based break-glass access scheme, which is con-
structed based on two-factor encryption: password based encryption and master secret
key based encryption.
1.2.2. Secure Deduplication
In 2013, Bellare et al. [3] proposed a message-locked encryption primitive to
achieve secure deduplication, in which the encryption and decryption keys are derived
from the message. They extend their work [3] to interactive message-locked encryp-
tion [4] with both upload and download protocols. The deduplication systems in both
research projects [3, 4] can be interactive. Stanek et al. [29] suggested a secure storage
system supporting deduplication in cloud. In 2014, Li et al. [17] proposed a system
to control the convergent keys of deduplication. It is illustrated by the Dekey tech-
nology, which is constructed based on secret sharing. Later, they developed a scheme
to tackle the problem of deduplication with differential privileges in a hybrid cloud
architecture [18] based on public cloud and private cloud [8]. The proposal is secure
against collusion attack and proved indistinguishable of the file token/duplicate-check
token. In 2015, a new secure deduplication system was demonstrated in [20], which is
constructed based on password authenticated key exchange protocol. Since these se-
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cure deduplication systems do not consider the access control problem, Cui et al. [11]
proposed an secure deduplication system with attribute based access control, which is
based on zero-knowledge proof.
1.2.3. Attribute Based Encryption
In 2007, an attribute-based encryption (ABE) algorithm is presented by Ostrovsky
[27] such that the secret key of users can represent both monotone and non-monotone
access policy. In order to reduce the decryption computation overhead, Green et al.
[13] suggested to outsource the decryption burden, so that the user can recover the
message with lightweight computation. To validate the correctness of the transformed
ciphertext, the verifiable outsourced decryption problem is studied in [16, 28, 23] to
provide an effective way for the correctness verification. The traitor tracing problem in
ABE is investigated in [21, 26] to deduce the identity of the malicious users who have
sold the secret key for monetary benefits. The secure search over encrypted ABE data
is studied in [19, 30] to provide efficient keyword search. For example, the data user
sends a keyword trapdoor to the server to issue a search query. The server responds
with the match ciphertext that contain the same keyword. To extend the ABE security
for video content, a time-domain attribute based access control scheme is proposed by
Yang et al. [31] to protect the cloud based video content sharing, which embeds the
time into the ciphertext and keys to realize time control. To reduce the trust on a single
authority, the multi-authority ABE scheme are investigated in [14, 15, 34, 22].
2. Preliminary
In this section, we review some basic notions and definitions used in the remaining
sections. The main notations are listed in Table 1.
2.1. Access Policy
Definition 1 (Access Structure [2]). Define {P1, · · · , Pn} as the entities. A ⊆
2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if anyB and C satisfies: C ∈ A whenB ∈ A andB ⊆ C. An
access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection (resp. mono-




KGC key generation center
MIi the i-th medical institution
Ui,j the j-th user in the i-th medical institution
PIDi,j the pseudo identity of Ui,j
PP public parameter of the system
MSK master secret key of the system
PKi/SKi public/secret key of MIi
SKi,j secret key of user Ui,j
DKi,j/TKi,j delegation/transformation key of user Ui,j
pwi,j password of user Ui,j
BGKi,j break-glass key of user Ui,j
(BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2) auxiliary message of BGKi,j
(A, ρ, δ) access policy
attr attribute
M electronic medical file
CT ciphertext of M
CT ′ re-encrypted ciphertext of CT
CTp partial ciphertext of CT
pf proof message of ciphertext CT
κ security parameter
p a prime number
Z∗p {1, · · · , p− 1}
Z+ positive integer
a ∈R S a is randomly chosen from S
i ∈ [l] 1 ≤ i ≤ n
SEnc/SDec secure symmetric encryption/decryption
K symmetric key space of SEnc/SDec
H1 H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p
H2 H2 : {0, 1}∗ → K
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The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the unau-
thorized sets.
Definition 2 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [2]). A secret-sharing scheme
Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if
• The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
• There exists a matrix M with l rows and n columns called the share-generating
matrix for Π. For all i = 1, · · · , l, the ith row of M is labeled by a party ρ(i) (ρ is
a function from {1, · · · , l} to P). Set the column vector v = (s, r2, · · · , rn), where
s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, · · · , rn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen, then Mv
is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (Mv)i belongs to
party ρ(i).
Every LSSS according to the definition achieves the linear reconstruction property
[2]. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized
set and I ⊂ {1, · · · , l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exists constants
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, if {λi}i∈I are valid shares of any secret s according to Π,
then
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. Furthermore, it is shown in [2] that these constants {ωi}i∈I
can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix M . For
unauthorized sets, no such constants exist. In this paper, an LSSS matrix (M,ρ) will
be used to express an access policy associated to a ciphertext.
2.2. Bilinear Groups
Let Gp be an algorithm that on input the security parameter λ, outputs the parame-
ters of a prime order bilinear map as (p, g,G,GT , e), where G and GT are multiplica-
tive cyclic groups of prime order p and g is a random generator of G. The mapping
e : G×G→ GT is a bilinear map. The bilinear map e has three properties: (1) bilin-
earity: ∀u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(uv)ab. (2) non-degeneracy:
e(g, g) 6= 1. (3) computability: e can be efficiently computed.
2.3. Hardness Problem
Assumption 1 (DBDH: decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption). Let G be
a bilinear group of prime order p and g be a generator of G. Let α, β, η ∈ Z∗p be chosen
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at random. If an adversary A is given ~y = (g, gα, gβ , gη), it is hard for the attacker A
to distinguish e(g, g)αβη ∈ GT from an element T that is randomly chosen from GT .
3. System and Security Model
3.1. System Model
Fig. 1 presents the system model architecture of IoT-based healthcare big data stor-
age system with self-adaptive access control and smart deduplication, which involves
the following entities. The characteristic and function of each entity are introduced as
follows.
• Key generation center (KGC): KGC is a third trusted entity and responsible
to generate the system public parameter. It also creates a master secret key and
keeps it confidentially. KGC verifies the medical quality of the medical institutes
and generates public/secret keys for them.
• Medical institute (MI): This system can accommodate different medical insti-
tutes. A medical institute is responsible to treat the patients, and responsible for
managing their patients and medical staffs in its medical domain. A “medical
institute” should register to the KGC to obtain the public/secret key pair. Addi-
tionally, it assigns the patients and medical staffs a set of attributes to describe
their characteristics, and generates attribute secret keys for them. Each medical
institute has its own private cloud to enable the storage and computation services
on behalf of the users in its management domain, such as patient’s emergency
contact person list storage, ciphertext re-encryption and break-glass key extrac-
tion, etc.
• Data owner (medical-IoT based): The patients always play the role of data owner
and are monitored by the medical IoT system. Several tiny wireless sensors are
embedded inside or surface-mounted on the skin of patients to formulate a health
IoT network. The vital physiology parameters are continuously detected by these
sensors and sent to an aggregate node. Then, the patient’s electronic healthcare
data is included in an electronic medical file. To guarantee the privacy of patient,
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Figure 1: System Model
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the medical file is encrypted to a ciphertext, and an access policy is designated for
the ciphertext to exert access control such that only authorized users can recover
the protected medical files, which are outsourced to the public cloud. To reduce
the possibility into emergency situation, the patient pre-sets a password, a break-
glass key and a set of emergency contact person (such as his physician-in-charge,
family or friends). The break-glass key can decrypt any encrypted medical files
of the targeted patient. The patient can tell the emergency contact person (ECP)
his password such that the ECP could derive the break-glass key and recover
patient’s medical files when the patient encounters an emergency situation. The
ECP list is managed by the private cloud of the medical institute.
• Public cloud: The public cloud is responsible to store the healthcare big data for
different medical institutes and responds on the data access queries. It verifies
whether the data user is authorized to access the data according to data user’s at-
tributes and the encrypted files’ access policy. It also provides partial decryption
service to the system users to alleviate the computation burden. In order to elim-
inate the duplicate copies of encrypted medical files, the public cloud interacts
with the medical institute’s private cloud to execute deduplication operations to
save the storage space.
• Data user: The data user (such as healthcare staffs or patient’s friends, relatives)
registers to the medical institute to obtain the attribute secret key. Data user
sends data access query to the public cloud to get the encrypted medical files,
and decrypt them using the attribute secret key.
• Emergency contact person (ECP): The patient pre-shares his password with the
ECP. When the patient is in a risky situation, the ECP utilizes the password to
derive the break-glass key and decrypts patient’s medical files.
3.2. Formal Definition
This privacy-preserving smart IoT-based healthcare big data storage and self-adaptive
access control system has thirteen algorithms: global setup algorithm GlobalSetup,
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medical institute key generation algorithm KeyGen.MI , user’s attribute key gener-
ation algorithm KeyGen.User, delegation key generation algorithm KeyGen.Del,
break-glass key generation algorithm KeyGen.BGK, break-glass key extraction al-
gorithm Extract.BGK, medical file encryption algorithm Enc, ciphertext validity
test algorithm V alidityTest, message equality test algorithm MsgTest, ciphertex-
t re-encryption algorithm ReEnc, partial decryption algorithm PartialDec, type-1
decryption algorithm Dec1 and type-2 decryption algorithm Dec2.
1. GlobalSetup(1κ) → (PP,MSK). The KGC operates the GlobalSetup al-
gorithm. Taken as input the security parameter 1κ, the global setup algorithm
generates the public parameter PP and master secret key MSK for the system.
Since PP is an input in all the following algorithms, we omit it to simply the
presentation.
2. KeyGen.MI(MIi,MSK) → (PKi, SKi). The KGC operates the algorith-
m KeyGen.MI . Taken as input the master secret key MSK and medical in-
stitute’s identity MIi, KGC verifies the medical quality of MIi and generates
public/private key pair PKi/SKi for MIi.
3. KeyGen.User(MIi, P IDi,j , SKi, {attrk}k∈[ϕ]) → SKi,j . The medical in-
stitute MIi operates the KeyGen.User algorithm. Taken as input the identity
MIi of the medical institute, the user’s pseudo identity PIDi,j ,MIi’s secret key
SKi and the user’s attributes {attrk}k∈[ϕ], the medical institute MIi generates
the attribute secret key SKi,j for the user.
4. KeyGen.Del(PIDi,j , SKi,j) → DKi,j . The user operates the KeyGen.Del
algorithm. Taken as input the user’s pseudonym PIDi,j and secret key SKi,j ,
the user generates a delegation key DKi,j and sends it to the public cloud.
5. KeyGen.BGK(PIDi,j , pwi,j) → (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2). The patient oper-
ates the KeyGen.BGK algorithm. Taken as input the patient’s pseudonym
PIDi,j and the password pwi,j , the patient generates a break-glass keyBGKi,j ,
a set of emergency contact person, and the auxiliary message (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2).
The BGKi,j,1 is sent to the public cloud. The auxiliary message BGKi,j,2 and
the emergency contact person list is sent to the private cloud of the medical in-
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stitute MIi.
6. Extract.BGK(PIDi,j , pwi,j , BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2) → BGKi,j . This algo-
rithm is interactively executed by the patient’s emergency contact person, the
public cloud and the medical institute. Taken as input the patient’s pseudonym
PIDi,j , the password pwi,j and the auxiliary messages BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2,
the break-glass key extraction algorithm outputs the break-glass key BGKi,j .
7. Enc(M, (A, ρ, δ), PKi, P IDi,j , BGKi,j)→ (CT, pf, TKi,j). The patient op-
erates the Enc algorithm. Taken as input the medical file M , the access policy
(A, ρ, δ), theMIi’s public key PKi, the patient’s pseudonym PIDi,j and break-
glass key BGKi,j , the encryption algorithm outputs the encrypted ciphertext
CT , a ciphertext proof message pf and a transformation key TKi,j . The cipher-
text CT and proof message pf are sent to public cloud for remote storage, and
the transformation key TKi,j is confidentially sent to the private cloud of the
medical institute MIi.
8. V alidityTest(CT, pf) → 1/0. The public cloud operates the V alidityTest
algorithm. Taken as input the ciphertext CT and the proof pf , the public cloud
tests the validity of the ciphertext. If it is valid, the algorithm outputs 1; other-
wise, it outputs 0.
9. MsgTest(pf1, pf2)→ 1/0. The public cloud operates theMsgTest algorithm.
Taken as input the ciphertext proofs pf1 and pf2, the public cloud tests whether
the two ciphertext are encryptions of the same message. If yes, the algorithm
outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.
10. ReEnc(PDIi,j , TKi,j , CT, (A′, ρ′, δ′)) → CT ′. The medical institute MIi
operates the ReEnc algorithm. Taken as input the patient’s pseudonym PDIi,j ,
the transformation key TKi,j , a ciphertext CT and an access policy (A′, ρ′, δ′),
it outputs another ciphertext CT ′ which has the same underlying plaintext as
CT , but is encrypted under the new access policy (A′, ρ′, δ′).
11. PartialDec(CT,DKi,j) → CTp. The public cloud operates the PartialDec
algorithm. Taken as input the ciphertext CT and the delegation key DKi,j , the
partial decryption algorithm outputs the partial ciphertext CTp.
12. Dec1(CTp, SKi,j) → M/⊥. The data user with attribute secret key operates
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the Dec1 algorithm. Taken as input the partial ciphertext CTp = (CM , C0, CT )
and the attribute key SKi,j , the Dec1 recovers M if the partial ciphertext CTp
is correct; otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
13. Dec2(PIDi,j , F ID,CM , BGKi,j) → M/⊥. The patient’s emergency contact
person with break-glass key operates the Dec2 algorithm. Taken as input the
patient’s pseudonym PIDi,j , the file number FID, the ciphertext CM and the
break-glass key BGKi,j , the Dec2 recovers M if the break-glass key BGKi,j
is correctly extracted; otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
3.3. Threat Model
Logically KGC is a fully trusted in the system. The service providers for public
cloud server and private cloud server of the medical institute are assumed to be “semi-
honest and curious”. The service provider of the public cloud is honest to store the
encrypted medical big data and execute the pre-defined calculations (such as ciphertext
validity test, message equality test and partial decryption operations), but it also curi-
ous to get the plaintext of patient’s medical message. Moreover, the service provider of
the public cloud may be selfish to save its computation resources to return an incorrect
transformed ciphertext to the data user. The service provider of the private cloud server
of medical institute is honest to store the emergency contact person list for the patients
and execute the re-encryption operations using a new access policy in the deduplication
process, but is also curious about patients’ private medical data. It is assumed that the
service provider of the public cloud and the private cloud do not collude with each oth-
er. Suppose that the attachers of the system have polynomial time bounded calculation
ability. As a result, they cannot solve the hardness problem defined in Section 2.
3.4. Security Model
The system is indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if there
is not polynomial time attacker A could win the following interactive game with non-
negligible advantage.
• Setup: The challenger C executes Setup algorithm to create the public param-
eter PP and master secret key MSK. The public parameter PP is sent to the
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attacker A and the master secret key MSK is kept secret.
• Query phase 1: The attacker A adaptively issues the following queries.
1. OKeyGen.MI : Receiving the key generation query for medical institute
MIi, the challenger C constructs the public/secret key pair for MIi by
calculating (PKi, SKi)← KeyGen.MI .
2. OKeyGen.user: Receiving the key generation query for user ui,j , the chal-
lenger C constructs the attribute secret key SKi,j by calculating SKi,j ←
KeyGen.User.
3. OKeyGen.Del: Receiving the delegation key generation query for user ui,j ,
the challenger C constructs the delegation keyDKi,j by calculatingDKi,j ←
KeyGen.Del.
4. OKeyGen.BGK : Receiving the break-glass key generation query for patient
ui,j , the challenger C constructs the break-glass key BGKi,j and its auxil-
iary message (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2) by calculating (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2)←
KeyGen.BGK.
5. OExtract.BGK : Receiving the break-glass key extraction query for patient
ui,j with patient’s password pwi,j , the challenger C constructs the break-
glass key BGKi,j by calculating BGKi,j ← Extract.BGK.
• Challenge: The adversaryA sends a challenge user u∗i,j (with pseudonymPID∗i,j),
a challenge access policy (A∗, ρ∗, δ∗) and two challenge messages (M∗0 ,M∗1 ) to
C. Then, the challenger C flips a coin to randomly select b ∈R {0, 1}. C con-
structs ciphertext for M∗b , which is sent to attacker A.
• Query phase 2: The adversaryA adaptively issues the queries as in phase 1. The
requirement is that the attribute secret key or break-glass key for the challenge
user u∗i,j (with pseudonym PID
∗
i,j) should not be queried.
• Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, challenger C outputs
1 meaning that A wins the game. Otherwise, C outputs 0.
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4. The proposed system
This system has three distinguished functions: cross-domain data sharing, self-
adaptive access control in normal and emergency situations, and smart deduplication.
In order to realize cross-domain data sharing, each medical institute (MI) registers
to KGC and obtains the public/secret key pair PKi/SKi utilizing KeyGen.MI algo-
rithm. Then, the j-th user (such as patients, doctors and nurses) registers to the i-th MI
and obtains its public/secret attribute key pair PKi,j/SKi,j utilizing KeyGen.User
algorithm. In the data encryption Enc algorithm, the data owner defines a cross-
domain access policy (A, ρ, δ), which is embedded in the ciphertext CT . Then, the
data users with attributes can satisfy the access policy and execute the decryptionDec1
algorithm to recover patient’s medical record.
The self-adaptive access control is adaptive to the normal and emergency situations,
and the normal situation is described above. A password-based break-glass mechanis-
m is designed to realize the access control in emergency situation, which is illustrated
mainly in the encryption Enc algorithm, break-glass key generation KeyGen.BGK
algorithm, break-glass key extraction Extract.BGK algorithm, and decryption Dec2
algorithm to be used as follows. Firstly, the patient presets a password and pre-shares
it with a set of ECP. KeyGen.BGK algorithm is executed to generate the break-glass
key from the password. The auxiliary messages of the break-glass key are also generat-
ed in KeyGen.BGK algorithm, which are respectively sent to MI and public cloud.
Then, the patient utilizes the break-glass key to encrypt the message in the Enc algo-
rithm. When emergency situation occurs, the ECP of patient interactive with MI and
public cloud to extract the break-glass key in the Extract.BGK algorithm. Lastly,
ECP utilizes the extracted break-glass key to recover patient’s medical files in Dec2
algorithm.
The secure deduplication effectively discovers the ciphertexts that contain the same
plaintext and re-encrypt them into a new ciphertext, which can be accessed by all
the original authorized data users. Firstly, public cloud runs ciphertext validity test
V alidityTest algorithm to test whether the stored ciphertext is valid. Then, the mes-
sage equality test MsgTest algorithm is executed to test whether two ciphertexts con-
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tain the same plaintext. Lastly, the ciphertext re-encryption ReEnc algorithm can run
to generate a new ciphertext with a combined cross-domain access policy.
4.1. System Setup
Taken as input the security parameter 1κ, the key generation center (KGC) creates
the system public parameter PP and the master secret key MSK. The public parame-
ter PP is public in the whole system andMSK is confidentially stored by KGC. PP is
a default input in the following algorithms, which is omitted to simply the presentation.
GlobalSetup(1κ) → (PP,MSK). KGC operates GlobalSetup algorithm. Tak-
en as input the security parameter 1κ, KGC randomly selects hash functions H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → K and cryptographically secure symmetric encryp-
tion and decryption pair SEnc/SDec with secret key space K. Then, KGC chooses
random numbers η ∈R Z∗p, g, g1, g2, g3 ∈R G and calculates Y = e(g1, g2)η . Lastly,
KGC sets the public parameter as PP = (g, g1, g2, g3, Y,H1, H2, SEnc/SDec) and
master secret key as MSK = η.
Figure 2: System Setup
User (PIDi,j) Medical Institute (MIi) KGC public cloud
chooseH1 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗p ;
chooseH2 : {0, 1}
∗ → K;
choose η ∈R Z
∗
p ;
choose g, g1, g2, g3 ∈R G;
Y = e(g1, g2)
η ;





4.2. Key Generation for Medical Institute
When a medical institute registers to the system as the i-th medical institute, the
KGC checks whether it is a qualified institute. If it is verified, KGC assigns an identity
MIi to the medical institute and generates public key PKi and secret key SKi for
MIi. The public key PKi of MIi is public in the system and the secret key SKi is
confidentially sent to MIi via a secure channel.
KeyGen.MI(MIi,MSK) → (PKi, SKi). This algorithm is executed by the
KGC. Taken as input the master secret keyMSK and medical institute’s identityMIi,
KGC randomly selects αi, βi, νi ∈R Z∗p. Then, KGC calculates the elements of MIi’s
public key PKi as
pki,1 = g
αi , pki,2 = g
βi ,
and the elements of MIi’s secret key SKi as
Ki,1 = g
αi




3 ,Ki,4 = g
νi




PKi = (pki,1, pki,2), SKi = (Ki,1,Ki,2,Ki,3,Ki,4,Ki,5).
4.3. Key Generation for User
When a user Ui,j registers with medical institute MIi as the j-th user, the medical
institute firstly verifies user’s identity. The system user can be a patient, a doctor, a
nurse or some other roles. To preserve the privacy of user, MIi assigns a pseudo iden-
tity PIDi,j ∈ G to the user Ui,j and conceals the real identity. According to the user’s
identity, MIi assigns a set of attributes {attrk}k∈[ϕ] to describe user’s characteristics.
Then, MIi generates the attribute secret key SKi,j for user PIDi,j .
KeyGen.User(MIi, P IDi,j , SKi, {attrk}k∈[ϕ]) → SKi,j . The medical insti-
tute MIi operates the KeyGen.User algorithm. Taken as input the identity MIi of
the medical institute, the user’s pseudo identity PIDi,j , MIi’s secret key SKi and the
user’s attributes {attrk}k∈[ϕ], the medical instituteMIi randomly selects ν′i,j , t ∈R Z∗p
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Figure 3: Key Generation Process for Medical Institute
User (PIDi,j) Medical Institute (MIi) KGC public cloud




















PKi = (pki,1, pki,2);




and sets νi,j = νi + ν′i,j for some unknown νi. Then, MIi computes the elements of
PIDi,j’s secret key SKi,j as




























and sets SKi,j = (ski,j,1, ski,j,2, ski,j,3, {Γi,j,k}k∈[ϕ]).
Figure 4: Key Generation for User
User (PIDi,j) Medical Institute (MIi) KGC public cloud
choose ν′i,j , t ∈R Z
∗
p ;
set νi,j = νi + ν
′
i,j ;



























4.4. Delegation Key Generation
In this phase, the user (with pseudonym PIDi,j) generates a delegation keyDKi,j ,
which is sent to the public cloud. The public cloud utilizes the delegation key to trans-
form the ciphertext such that the user can use a lightweight computation to recover
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the medical file. At the same time, the plaintext medical file is unknown to the public
cloud.
KeyGen.Del(PIDi,j , SKi,j) → DKi,j . The user operates the KeyGen.Del
algorithm. Taken as input the user’s pseudonym PIDi,j and secret key SKi,j , the user



























Then, user sets the delegation keyDKi,j = (DK1, DK2, DK3, DK4, {DK5,k}k∈[ϕ]),
which is confidentially sent to the public cloud.
Figure 5: Delegated Key Generation
User (PIDi,j) Medical Institute (MIi) KGC public cloud




























4.5. Password based Break-glass Key Generation
In order to provide effective data access when the patient encounters emergency
situation (such as suddenly fainted or heart attack), the patient sets a password based
break-glass keyBGKi,j , which can be used to decrypt all the encrypted medical files of
the patient. The patient (with pseudonym PIDi,j) sets a password pwi,j and a break-
glass key BGKi,j . The patients designates a set of emergency contact person (e.g.,
his physician-in-charge, family or friends), and secretly tells them the password pwi,j .
These emergency contact person can deduce the break-glass key using the password
pwi,j . The emergency contact person list is stored in the private cloud of the patient’s
medical institute. The patient utilizes the password pwi,j to generate break-glass key
BGKi,j’s auxiliary messages (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2), which are sent to public cloud
and MIi’s private cloud, respectively. These auxiliary messages are used to help the
emergency contact personals to recover the break-glass keyBGKi,j from the password
pwi,j .
KeyGen.BGK(PIDi,j , pwi,j) → (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2). The patient operates
the KeyGen.BGK algorithm. Taken as input the patient’s pseudonym PIDi,j and
the password pwi,j , the patient randomly selects ζ1, ζ2, σ1, σ2 ∈R Z∗p, Ψ,Ψ1 ∈R G
and sets the break-glass key as BGKi,j = Ψ. Then, the patients calculates
Ψ2 = Ψ · (gσ1+σ2)ς1 · (Ψ1)−1,
Cpwi,j = (g
σ1+σ2)ς2 · gH1(pwi,j)1 .
The break-glass key auxiliary messages (BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2) are calculated as
BGKi,j,1 = (σ1,Ψ1, g
ζ1 , gζ2 , Cpwi,j ),
BGKi,j,2 = (σ2,Ψ2, g
ζ1 , gζ2 , Cpwi,j ).
Then, BGKi,j,1 and BGKi,j,2 are secretly sent to public cloud and MIi, respec-
tively.
4.6. Password based Break-glass Key Extraction
When a patient (with pseudonym PIDi,j) encounters some emergency situation,
it is necessary to quickly access to patient’s encrypted medical files to give him first-
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Figure 6: Password based Break-glass Key Generation
User (PIDi,j) Public Cloud Medical Institute (MIi)
choose ζ1, ζ2, σ1, σ2 ∈R Z
∗
p ;
choose Ψ,Ψ1 ∈R G;
setBGK = Ψ;
Ψ2 = Ψ · (g
σ1+σ2 )ς1 · (Ψ1)
−1 ;
Cpwi,j
= (gσ1+σ2 )ς2 · g
H1(pwi,j)
1 ;
BGKi,j,1 = (σ1,Ψ1, g
ζ1 , gζ2 , Cpwi,j
);
BGKi,j,2 = (σ2,Ψ2, g






aid treatments. The medical institute MIi contacts his designated emergency contac-
t person, who knows patient’s password pwi,j corresponding to the break-glass key
BGKi,j . This emergency contact person interacts with the public cloud and MIi to
recover the break-glass key BGKi,j , which can be used to decrypt all of the patien-
t’s encrypted medical files. The break-glass key can be extracted using the following
algorithm.
Extract.BGK(PIDi,j , pwi,j , BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2) → BGKi,j . This algorith-
m is interactively executed by the patient’s emergency contact person, the public cloud
and the medical institute. Taken as input the patient’s pseudonym PIDi,j , the pass-
word pwi,j and the break-glass key’s auxiliary messages BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2, this
algorithm outputs the break-glass key BGKi,j . The interactive process is executed as
below and also shown in Fig. 7.
• The emergency contact person selects random number % ∈R Z∗p and calculates
Φ = g% · gH1(pwi,j)1 , which is sent to public cloud and MIi.
• The public cloud selects random number a1 ∈R Z∗p and calculates U1 = (gζ2)a1 ,
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which is sent to MIi.
• The medical institute MIi selects random number a2 ∈R Z∗p and calculates
U2 = (g
ζ2)a2 and transmits it to the public cloud.
• The public cloud computes
A1 = g
a1 ,W1 = Ψ1 · (Cpwi,j · Φ−1)a1 · (gζ1 · U1 · U2)−σ1
and sends (A1,W1) to the emergency contact person.
• The medical institute MIi computes
A2 = g
a2 ,W2 = Ψ2 · (Cpwi,j · Φ−1)a2 · (gζ1 · U1 · U2)−σ2
and sends (A2,W2) to the emergency contact person.
• The user recovers the break-glass key by computing
BGKi,j = Ψ = (W1 ·W2) · (A1 ·A2)%.
4.7. Encryption
When the medical record is generated by the medical IoT network, the patient
encrypts the message M to the ciphertext and enforce an access policy (A, ρ, δ) in the
encryption algorithm, which outputs a ciphertext CT , a transformation key TKi,j and
a proof message pf . The transformation key TKi,j is utilized in the deduplication
algorithm to re-encrypt the a ciphertext using a combined access policy, which will
be detailedly introduced in the re-encryption algorithm. The proof message pf helps
the public cloud to distinguish the different ciphertext that are the encryption of the
same file. The transformation key TKi,j is confidentially sent to MIi and (CT, pf)
are stored by the public cloud.
Enc(M, (A, ρ, δ), PKi, P IDi,j , BGKi,j) → (CT, pf, TKi,j). This algorithm is
executed by the patient. The algorithm inputs are the medical file M , the cross-domain
access policy (A, ρ, δ), the MIi’s public key PKi, the patient’s pseudonym PIDi,j
24
Figure 7: Password based Break-glass Key Extraction
User (PIDi,j) Public Cloud Medical Institute (MIi)
choose % ∈R Z
∗
p ;





choose a1 ∈R Z
∗









a1 ; A2 = g
a2
W1 = Ψ1 · (Cpwi,j · Φ
−1)a1 W2 = Ψ2 · (Cpwi,j · Φ
−1)a2
·(gζ1 · U1 · U2)




BGKi,j = Ψ = (W1 ·W2) · (A1 · A2)
%
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and break-glass key BGKi,j , where A ∈ Zl×np , ρ maps A’s rows to medical institutes
and δ maps A’s rows to attributes. Let Ax be the x-th row of A.
The patient randomly selects z, v2, · · · , vn, w2, · · · , wn ∈R Z∗p and sets v =
(z, v2, · · · , vn)>, w = (0, w2, · · · , wn)>. Let λx = 〈Ax,v〉 and wx = 〈Ax,w〉,
which represent the shares of z and 0 corresponding to row x, respectively. He com-
putes the transformation key TKi,j = gz3 .
The patient randomly selects tx ∈R Z∗p for each row x in A and chooses $ ∈R
Z+. For the electronic medical file M , the patient sets a file number FID ∈ G and
computes the elements of ciphertext CT as below.
Υ = H2(Ψ, P IDi,j , F ID),




C0 = Υ · Y z = Υ · e(g1, g2)η·z,
C1,x = g
λx
3 · (pkρ(x),1)tx = g
λx








where M ||0$ denotes $-0s are concatenated after M .
The ciphertext CT is defined as
CT = (CM , C−1, C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, C4,x}x∈[l]).
Then, the patient randomly selects s, r1, r2 ∈R Z∗p and computes the proof message
pf of CT as below.
D1 = g
H1(M)·s, D2 = g
s, D3 = g
H1(M) · gH1(Υ)1 ,
B1 = D
r1
2 , B2 = g
r1 · gr21 ,
θ = H1(CM , C−1, C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, C4,x}x∈[l], D1, D2, D3, B1, B2),
D4 = r1 − θ ·H1(M), D5 = r2 − θ ·H1(Υ).
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The proof message pf is defined as
pf = (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, θ).
Then, the patient outsources (PIDi,j , F ID,CT, pf) to the public cloud and se-
cretly sends the transformation key TKi,j to the medical institute MIi.
4.8. Ciphertext Validity Test
In the deduplication process, the public cloud firstly checks whether the stored
ciphertext is a valid one. The ciphertext validity text algorithm outputs 1 to indicate
that the ciphertext is valid; otherwise, it outputs 0.
V alidityTest(CT, pf) → 1/0. The public cloud operates the V alidityTest al-









3 · gD4 · g
D5
1 ,
θ′ = H1(CM , C−1, C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, C4,x}x∈[l], D1, D2, D3, B′1, B′2),
and verifies whether the equation holds θ′ = θ. If it holds, the algorithm outputs 1;
otherwise, it outputs 0.
4.9. Message Equality Test
If the two ciphertext are verified to be valid by the validity test algorithm, the mes-
sage equality test algorithm verifies whether they are the encryption of the same mes-
sage. If yes, the algorithm outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.
MsgTest(pf1, pf2) → 1/0. The public cloud operates the MsgTest algorithm.
Taken as input the ciphertext proofs pf1 and pf2, the public cloud parses the proofs as









′). It tests whether
the equation e(D1, D′2) = e(D
′
1, D2) holds. If it holds, the algorithm outputs 1 to




If a set of ciphertext are verified to contain the same message and belongs to the
same data owner, they will be deduplicated. Suppose the ciphertext and the correspond-
ing access policies are (CT1, (A1, ρ1, δ1)), · · · , (CTm, (Am, ρm, δm)). The medical
institute MIi firstly combines these access policies as (A′, ρ′, δ′), which is a union
set of the access policies ((A1, ρ1, δ1), · · · , (Am, ρm, δm)). Then, MIi re-encrypts
the ciphertext using the combined cross-domain access policy (A′, ρ′, δ′) to generate a
new ciphertext CT ′. In that way, any pre-defined authorized data user of the ciphertext
(CT1, · · · , CTm) can access to the new ciphertext CT ′. Denote the ciphertext with the
least file number in (CT1, · · · , CTm) asCT . SupposeCT = CT1 and FID = FID1.
ReEnc(PDIi,j , TKi,j , CT, (A′, ρ′, δ′))→ CT ′. The medical instituteMIi oper-
ates the ReEnc algorithm. The inputs of the re-encryption algorithm are the patient’s
pseudonym PDIi,j , the transformation key TKi,j , a ciphertext CT and a combined
access policy (A′, ρ′, δ′), where A′ ∈ Zl′×n′p , ρ′ maps the rows of A′ to medical in-
stitutes and δ′ maps the rows of A′ to attributes. Let A′x be the x-th row of A′, and
A′x = (a′x,1, · · · , a′x,n′).
The medical institute MIi randomly selects z̄, v′2, · · · , v′n, w′2, · · · , w′n ∈R Z∗p and
sets v′ = (z′, v′2, · · · , v′n)>, w′ = (0, w′2, · · · , w′n), where z′ = z + z̄ for some
unknown z. Let λ′x = 〈A′x,v′〉 and w′x = 〈A′x,w′〉, which represent the shares of z′
and 0 corresponding to row x, respectively. The medical instituteMIi selects t′x ∈R Z∗p
for each row x of A′. The re-encrypted ciphertext




0, {C ′1,x, C ′2,x, C ′3,x, C ′4,x}x∈[l])
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is constructed as below.
C ′M = CM ,
C ′−1 = C−1 · gz̄1 = gz
′
1 ,
C ′0 = C0 · Y z̄ = Υ · Y z
′
,










C ′2,x = g
−t′x ,








C ′4,x = g
H1(δ(x))·t′x
3 .







x,1 + · · ·+ v′n′a′x,n′ . The element C ′1,x is actually computed as
below using the transformation key TKi,j .









































It is obvious that the distribution of CT ′ is consistent with the that in Enc algorith-
m.
4.11. Partial Decryption
In order to alleviate the computation burden of data user, the public cloud utilizes
the delegation key DKi,j to partially decrypt the ciphertext and generates a partial
ciphertext CTp. During the process, the plaintext M is unknown to the public cloud.
PartialDec(CT,DKi,j) → CTp. The public cloud operates the PartialDec
algorithm. Taken as input the ciphertext CT and the delegation key DKi,j , the public
cloud computes cx ∈ Zp such that
∑
x cx ·Ax = (1, 0, · · · , 0). Then, it calculates
CT =
∏






and sends the partial ciphertext CTp = (CM , C0, CT ) to data user.
4.12. Decryption with Attribute Key and Verification
The data user with attribute key SKi,j recovers the medical file M using the de-
cryption algorithm Dec1.
Dec1(CTp, SKi,j) → M/⊥. This algorithm is executed by the data user with at-
tribute secret key. Taken as input the partial ciphertext CTp = (CM , C0, CT ) and the
attribute key SKi,j , the data user recovers Υ = C0·(CT )τ
−1
,M ′ = SDec(H2(Υ), CM ).
If M ′ = M ||0$, it indicates that the partial decryption executed by the public cloud is
correct and the Dec1 algorithm outputs the medical file M ; otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
4.13. Decryption with Break-glass Key and Verification
In emergency situation, the patient’s emergency contact person extracts the break-
glass keyBGKi,j using the Extract.BGK algorithm. Then, he decrypts the patients’
medical files utilizing the decryption algorithm Dec2.
Dec2(PIDi,j , F ID,CM , BGKi,j) → M/⊥. This algorithm is executed by the
patient’s emergency contact person with break-glass key. Taken as input the patient’s
pseudonym PIDi,j , the file number FID, the ciphertext CM and the break-glass key
BGKi,j , the emergency contact person recovers Υ = H2(BGKi,j , P IDi,j , F ID)
and M ′ = SDec(H2(Υ), CM ). If M ′ = M ||0$, it indicates that the break-glass
key BGKi,j is correctly extracted and the Dec1 algorithm outputs the medical file M ;
otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
5. Correctness
5.1. Ciphertext Validity Test Correctness
If the ciphertext is valid with well-formed ciphertext
CT = (CM , C−1, C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, C4,x}x∈[l])
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and proof message pf = (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, θ), the the correctness of ciphertext







= gsr1 = Dr12 = B1,
B′2 = D
θ
3 · gD4 · g
D5
1 = (g
H1(M) · gH1(Υ)1 )θ · gr1−θ·H1(M) · g
r2−θ·H1(Υ)
1
= gr1 · gr21 = B2,
where θ = H1(CM , C−1, C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, C4,x}x∈[l], D1, D2, D3, B1, B2).
5.2. Message Equality Test Correctness
Suppose the ciphertext is verified valid by the ciphertext validity test algorithm.









, gs) = e(D′1, D2).
5.3. Password based Break-glass Key Extraction Correctness
The correctness of the password based break-glass key extraction algorithm can be
verified as below.
(W1 ·W2) · (A1 ·A2)%
= [Ψ1 · (Cpwi,j · Φ−1)a1 · (gζ1 · U1 · U2)−σ1 ] ·
[Ψ2 · (Cpwi,j · Φ−1)a2 · (gζ1 · U1 · U2)−σ2 ] · (ga1 · ga2)%
= (Ψ1 ·Ψ2) · (Cpwi,j · Φ−1)a1+a2
·(gζ1 · U1 · U2)−(σ1+σ2) · (ga1 · ga2)%
= [Ψ · (gσ1+σ2)ς1 ]




·[gζ1 · (gζ2)a1+a2 ]−(σ1+σ2) · (ga1 · ga2)%
= [Ψ · (gσ1+σ2)ς1 ] · (g(σ1+σ2)·ς2 · g−%)a1+a2




The correctness of the decryption algorithmsDec1 andDec2 are obvious. We only
needs to verify the correctness of partial decryption algorithm.
e(C1,x, DK2) · e(C2,x, DK5,δ(x)) · e(C3,x, DK4) · e(C4,x, DK3)
= e[gλx3 · gαρ(x)·tx , (g
νi,j
1 )











νi,j ·λx·τ · e(g, g1)αρ(x)·tx·νi,j ·τ
·e(g, g1)−αρ(x)·tx·νi,j ·τ · e[g−tx , g
H1(PIDi,j)·βi·τ
2 ] · e[g−tx , g
H1(δ(x))·t·τ
3 ]
·e[gβρ(x)·tx , gH1(PIDi,j)·τ2 ] · e[gwx , g
H1(PIDi,j)·τ





νi,j ·λx·τ · e(gH1(PIDi,j)2 , g)wx·τ ,
∏
x





νi,j ·λx·τ · e(gH1(PIDi,j)2 , g)wx·τ ]cx
= e(g1, g3)
νi,j ·z·τ ,







τ ] = e(g1, g2)
η·z·τ · e(g1, g3)νi,j ·z·τ ,
∏






Theorem 1. This system is IND-CPA secure if the DBDH problem is intractable in
polynomial time.
Proof : Assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) attacker A
to undermine the proposed system’s security, then there exists a PPT algorithm C to
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solve the DBDH problem. The challenger C receives the tuple (g, gα, gβ , gη, T ) from
the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
• Setup. The challenger C has to construct the public parameters for the system
utilizing the DBDH tuple. C randomly selects g3 ∈ G and sets g1 = gα, g2 =
gβ , Y = T . C randomly selects hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → K and cryptographically secure symmetric encryption and decryption
pair SEnc/SDec with secret key space K. Then, C sends the public parameter
PP = (g, g1, g2, g3, Y,H1, H2, SEnc/SDec) to the attacker A.
• Query phase 1: The adversary A adaptively issues the following queries.
1. OKeyGen.MI : Receiving a key generation query for medical institute MIi,
the challenger C randomly chooses αi, βi, νi ∈R Z∗p and compute pki,1 =
gαi , pki,2 = g





gνi1 ,Ki,5 = g
αi·νi
1 . C sets the public key of MIi as PKi = (pki,1, pki,2)
and the secret key of MIi as SKi = (Ki,1,Ki,2,Ki,3,Ki,4,Ki,5), which
are then sent to the attacker A.
2. OKeyGen.User: Receiving an attribute key generation query for user ui,j
with pseudonym PIDi,j and a set of attributes {attrk}k∈[ϕ], the chal-
lenger C randomly selects νi,j , t ∈R Z∗p ∈R Z∗p and compute ski,j,1 =
gη2g
νi,j
3 , ski,j,2 = g
νi,j
1 , ski,j,3 = g







3 for k ∈ [ϕ]. Then C sends the constructed attribute secret key
SKi,j = (ski,j,1, ski,j,2, ski,j,3, {Γi,j,k}k∈[ϕ]) to the attacker A.
3. OKeyGen.Del: Receiving the delegation key generation query for user ui,j
with pseudonym PIDi,j , the challenger C firstly construct the attribute se-
cret key SKi,j = (ski,j,1, ski,j,2, ski,j,3, {Γi,j,k}k∈[ϕ]) usingOKeyGen.User.
Then, C chooses random number τ ∈R Z∗p and calculatesDK1 = (ski,j,1)τ ,
DK2 = (ski,j,2)
τ , DK3 = (ski,j,3)τ , DK4 = (g
H1(PIDi,j)
2 )
τ , DK5,k =
(Γi,j,k)
τ for k ∈ [ϕ]. C sends the delegation key
DKi,j = (DK1, DK2, DK3, DK4, {DK5,k}k∈[ϕ])
to the attacker A.
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4. OKeyGen.BGK : Receiving the break-glass key generation query for pa-
tient ui,j , the challenger C randomly selects a password pwi,j , random
numbers ζ1, ζ2, σ1, σ2 ∈R Z∗p, Ψ,Ψ1 ∈R G and sets the break-glass key
as BGKi,j = Ψ. Then, C calculates Ψ2 = Ψ · (gσ1+σ2)ς1 · (Ψ1)−1,
Cpwi,j = (g
σ1+σ2)ς2 · gH1(pwi,j)1 . The break-glass key auxiliary messages
(BGKi,j,1, BGKi,j,2) are calculated asBGKi,j,1 = (σ1,Ψ1, gζ1 , gζ2 , Cpwi,j ),
BGKi,j,2 = (σ2,Ψ2, g
ζ1 , gζ2 , Cpwi,j ). Then, BGKi,j,1 and BGKi,j,2 are
sent to the attacker A.
5. OExtract.BGK : Receiving the break-glass key extraction query for patient
ui,j with patient’s password pwi,j , the challenger C constructs the break-
glass key BGKi,j for patient ui,j using OKeyGen.BGK and sents it to the
attacker A.
• Challenge: The adversaryA sends a challenge user u∗i,j (with pseudonymPID∗i,j),
a challenge access policy (A∗, ρ∗, δ∗) and two challenge messages (M∗0 ,M∗1 ) to
C, where A∗ ∈ Zl∗×n∗p , ρ∗ maps the rows of A∗ to medical institutes and δ∗ map-
s the rows of A∗ to attributes. Then, the challenger C flips a coin to randomly
select b ∈R {0, 1}. Let A∗x be the x-th row of A∗.
The challenger C randomly chooses z∗, v∗2 , · · · , v∗n, w∗2 , · · · , w∗n ∈R Z∗p and sets
v∗ = (z∗, v∗2 , · · · , v∗n)>, w∗ = (0, w∗2 , · · · , w∗n)>. Let λ∗x = 〈A∗x,v∗〉 and
w∗x = 〈A∗x,w∗〉, which represent the shares of z∗ and 0 corresponding to row x,
respectively. C computes the transformation key TK∗i,j = gz
∗
3 .
C randomly selects t∗x ∈R Z∗p for each row x of A∗ and chooses random $∗ ∈R
Z+. The challenger C constructs the break-glass key BGK∗i,j for patient u∗i,j
using OKeyGen.BGK . For the electronic medical file M∗b , the patient sets a file




i,j , P ID
∗










∗ · Y z
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denotes $∗-0s are concatenated after M∗b .
The constructed challenge ciphertext is




0 , {C∗1,x, C∗2,x, C∗3,x, C∗4,x}x∈[l∗]).
Then, the challenger C randomly selects s∗, r∗1 , r∗2 ∈R Z∗p and computes the






, D∗2 = g
s∗ , D∗3 = g
H1(M
∗




























1 − θ∗ ·H1(M∗b ), D∗5 = r∗2 − θ∗ ·H1(Υ).
The proof message pf∗ is defined as










Then, the challenger C sends CT ∗, pf∗, TK∗i,j to the attacker A.
• Query phase 2: The adversary A adaptively issues the queries as in phase 1 with
the restriction that the attribute secret key or break-glass key for the challenge
user u∗i,j (with pseudonym PID
∗
i,j) should not be queried.
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• Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess b1 ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, challenger C outputs
1 meaning that T = e(g, g)αβη . Otherwise, C outputs 0 meaning that T is a
random element in GT .
• Probability Analysis. SupposeA has advantage ε in attacking decisional DBDH
assumption and C has advantage ε′ in winning this game. Then, it is easy to
know that ε′ = ε.
7. Performance Analysis
The utility function and efficiency are two important factors to evaluate a system.
In this section, we compare the proposed system with other related schemes in terms
of functionality, storage and computation costs. Then, these schemes are implemented
on an experimental test-bed to measure their performances.
7.1. Comparison
Shown in Table 2, the function of our system is compared with other schemes with
break-glass access [6, 7, 24, 25, 35], the schemes with secure deduplication [3, 29,
17, 18, 20, 4, 11], the attribute based encryption schemes [13, 16, 28, 23, 27, 21, 26,
19, 30, 31] and the multi-authority ABE schemes [14, 15, 34, 22]. It is obvious that
this proposed system demonstrates versatile useful functions compared with the other
existing schemes.
• Attribute based encryption: ABE is an important method to realize fine-grained
access control over encrypted data, where user’s private keys and the encrypted
files are associated with attributes or access policy. When the pre-set attributes
satisfies the access policy, the user is authorized to access to the plaintext. How-
ever, the schemes in [6, 24, 25, 35, 3, 29, 17, 18, 20, 4, 11] fail to support this
kind of access control pattern. The other schemes and our system enables ABE
mechanism.
• Cross-domain: In the electronic medical system, there are many different medi-
cal institutes and the patients are likely to register and be treated in different hos-
pitals. It is crucial to develop secure sharable medical file system cross diverse
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medical domains. Our system enables the encrypted medical files to be accessed
by the users (such as physicians, nurses or the friends of patients) from different
medical domains. The schemes in [14, 15, 34, 22] can also enable cross-domain
access control, but the other schemes [6, 7, 24, 25, 35, 3, 29, 17, 18, 20, 4, 11,
13, 16, 28, 23, 27, 21, 26, 19, 30, 31] cannot.
• Break-glass access: In emergency situations, the encrypted medical file owners
may be fainted and unable to authorize the access to any doctors when their files
are urgently demanded. The break-glass access mechanism provides emergency
access to patients medical files if the data owner’s authorization is not available.
Such access pattern is fatal in the medical application scenario to save patient’s
life. Unfortunately, very few research work has considered this requirement.
The paper [6, 7, 24, 25] discuss this issue but give no concrete construction.
The paper in [35] proposes a concrete break-glass method, but does not support
attribute based access control. Our system not only enables fine-grained access
control, but it also allows break-glass data access for emergency situations.
• Password based break-glass key: Apart of the attribute secret key, this proposed
system also enables password-based break-glass key to realize encrypted med-
ical file access. The password based break-glass key can be deduced using a
password, which is pre-set by the patient. The emergency contact person who
holds this password can recover the medical files through the password based
break-glass key on behalf of the patient. Our system and the scheme in [35]
supports password based break-glass key, while the other schemes do not.
• Outsource decryption: The outsource decryption methodology allows the pub-
lic cloud to transform an ABE ciphertext into a short pattern ciphertext using a
delegation key provided by the data user, such that the user can decrypt the trans-
formed ciphertext very efficiently than the decryption on the original ciphertext.
Our system and the schemes in [13, 16, 28, 23] support such decryption method,
while the others do not. However, the schemes in [13, 16, 28, 23] can only
support single domain outsource decryption. Our system supports outsource de-
cryption over cross-domain shared encrypted medical files.
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• Verifiable decryption: Since the service provider of the public cloud may be
selfish to save its computation resource and return a maliciously transformed
ciphertext to the data user, it is necessary to provide a method for the user to
verify the correctness of the transformation done by the public cloud, which is
refereed as ”verifiable decryption”. This function is supported by our system and
the schemes in [16, 28, 23].
• Secure deduplication: In order to save storage space and communication band-
width, the public cloud executes the secure deduplication algorithms to distin-
guish the set of ciphertext with the same underlying healthcare record. The re-
quirement is that the plaintext of the medical file is not revealed to the public
cloud. The schemes in [3, 29, 17, 18, 20, 4, 11] supports secure deduplication,
while the scheme in [11] and our system fully demonstrate secure deduplication
over attribute-based encrypted data.
Table 3 compares the storage overhead of our system and the other related schemes.
The notations PP , SKi,j and CT in Table 3 denote the size of the public parameter,
the user’s attribute secret key and the ciphertext, respectively. Let |U | be the size of the
universe attribute set U , l the number of rows in matrix A, and |S| the size of user’s
attribute set S.
• The sizes of the public parameter PP in schemes [11, 13, 26, 31, 14, 15, 34, 22]
and this proposed system are constant. However, |PP | in the other schemes
[16, 28, 23, 27, 21, 19, 30] linearly increase with the universal attribute set size
|U |. It not only wastes a lot of storage space, but it also introduces inflexibility
to the system. When a new attribute is to be added to the system, the entire
system has to be reconstructed. Hence, it is not practical in a large scale secure
electronic medical system.
• The sizes of the attribute secret key SKi,j of users in all the schemes grow with
the size of the user’s attribute set S. In our system, SKi,j comprises |S| + 3
elements in group G and the attribute secret key size is in the medium level
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Table 3: Storage Overhead Comparison
Scheme |PP | |SKi,j| |CT |
[11] 5|G|+ |GT | (2|S|+ 2)|G| (3l + 1)|G|+ |GT |
[27] (2|U |+ 3)|G| (5|S|)|G| (2l + 1)|G|+ |GT |
[13] 2|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 2)|G| (2l + 1)|G|+ |GT |
[16] (|U |+ 5)|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 2)|G| (4l + 3)|G|+ 2|GT |
[28] (|U |+ 2)|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 2)|G| (2l + 1)|G|+ |GT |
[23] (|U |+ 4)|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 2)|G| (2l + 1)G|+ |GT |
[21] (|U |+ 3)|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 3)|G|+ |Zp| (2l + 2)|G|+ |GT |
[26] 6|G|+ |GT | (2|S|+ 3)|G|+ |Zp| (3l + 2)|G|+ |GT |
[19] (2|U |+ 10)|G|+ 3|GT | (3|S|)|G| (l + 3)|G|+ 2|GT |
[30] (3|U |+ 1)|G|+ |GT | (2|S|+ 1)|G|+ |Zp| (l + 2)|G|
[31] |G| (3|S|)|G| (5l)|G|+ |GT |
[14] 3G| (|S|+ 1)|G| (5l)|G|+ |GT |
[15] 3|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 6)|G| (5l)|G|+ |GT |
[34] |G| |S| · |G| (3l)|G|+ |GT |
[22] 5|G|+ |GT | (4|S|+ 1)|G| (5l)|G|+ |GT |
Ours 4|G|+ |GT | (|S|+ 3)|G| (4l + 1)|G|+ |GT |
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among these compared schemes. It is less than the schemes in [11, 27, 21, 26,
19, 30, 31, 22], and larger than the schemes in [13, 16, 28, 23, 14, 34].
• The sizes of the ciphertext in all the schemes linearly increase with the number of
rows of the matrix A, which is utilized to define the access policy. In our system,
the ciphertext CT comprises 4l + 1 elements in group G and one element in
group GT , which is in the medium level among these compared schemes. It
is less than the schemes in [16, 31, 14, 15, 22], and larger than the schemes in
[11, 13, 28, 23, 27, 21, 26, 19, 30, 34].
Table 4 compares the computation overhead of our system and the other related
schemes. The notations KeyGen.User, Enc and Dec1 in Table 3 denote the user’s
attribute secret key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm and the decryption al-
gorithm using the attribute key respectively. The notations tp, te1 and te2 denote the
computation time of the bilinear pairing computation, exponentiation calculation in
group G and in group GT respectively.
• In KeyGen.User algorithm, the medical institute MIi needs 3|S|+ 3 exponen-
tiation calculations in group G to generate user’s attribute key, where S denotes
the attribute set of the user. The calculation overhead of the user’s attribute key
generation algorithm of our system is smaller than that in [11, 27, 26, 19, 31, 22]
and larger than that in [13, 16, 28, 23, 21, 30, 14, 34].
• In encryption Enc algorithm, the data owner needs 6l+ 1 exponentiation calcu-
lations in group G and one exponentiation calculations in group GT to generate
the encrypted medical file, where l denotes the number of rows in matrix A.
The calculation overhead of the ciphertext generation algorithm of our system is
smaller than that in [16, 31, 15] and larger than the other schemes.
• Due to the usage of oursouce decryption mechanism, our system consumes only
one exponentiation calculation in group G to recover the plaintext using user’s
attribute secret key. The schemes in [13, 16, 28, 23] also have such low computa-
tion cost. The scheme in [30] does not include decryption algorithm. The other
schemes suffer from high computation overhead in decryption algorithm. For
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instance, the scheme in [15] requires as high as 6|S| bilinear pairing calculations
and 2|S| exponentiation calculations in group GT to encrypt a message.
Table 4: Computation Overhead Comparison
Scheme KeyGen.User Enc Dec1
[11] (4|S|+ 3)te1 (5l + 4)te1 + te2 (3|S|+ 1)tp
[27] (6|S|)te1 tp + te2 + (2l + 1)te1 (3|S|)tp + |S|te1 + 2|S|te2
[13] (|S|+ 2)te1 tp + (3l + 1)te1 + te2 te1
[16] (|S|+ 3)te1 2tp + (6l + 4)te1 + 2te2 te1
[28] (|S|+ 3)te1 tp + (3l + 1)te1 + te2 te1
[23] (|S|+ 3)te1 tp + (3l + 3)te1 + te2 te1
[21] (|S|+ 4)te1
tp + te2+ (2|S|+ 1)tp + |S|te2
(3l + 2)te1 +(|S|+ 1)te1
[26] (4|S|+ 4)te1
tp + te2+ (3|S|+ 1)tp + |S|te2
(5l + 2)te1 +(|S|+ 1)te1
[19] 4|S|te1
2tp + 2te2+ 4tp + te2+
(l + 5)te1 (3l + 4)te1
[30]
(2|S|+ 2)te1 (2|S|+ 2)te1 ⊥
[31]
(4|S|)te1 (7l) · te1 (2|S|)tp + (6|S|)te1
[14] (|S|+ 3)te1 l · tp + (2l + 1)te1
(2|S|+ 1)tp
+|S|te1 + |S|te2
[15] (|S|+ 9)te1 l · tp + (6l)te1 + l · te2 (6|S|)tp + (2|S|)te2
[34] (2|S|)te1 tp + (5l)te1 + te2 |S| · te1
[22] (5|S|+ 1)te1 tp + (5l)te1 + te2 (4|S|+ 1)tp + te2
Ours (3|S|+ 3)te1 (6l + 1)te1 + te2 te1
In Table 5, the performance of each algorithm in our system is presented, which
includes both storage and computation overheads.
1. InGlobalSetup algorithm, the public parameter PP consists of four elements in
group G and one element in group GT , and the master secret keyMSK consists
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Table 5: Performance of Our System
Algorithm Parameter Storage Overhead Computation Overhead
GlobalSetup




SKi 4|G|+ |Zp| 5te1
KeyGen.User SKi,j (|S|+ 3)|G| (3|S|+ 3)te1







CT (4l + 1)|G|+ |GT | (6l + 1)te1 + te2
pf 3|G|+ 3|Zp| te1
TKi,j |G| 7te1
V alidityTest – 5te1
MsgTest – 2tp
ReEnc CT ′ (4l + 1)|G|+ |GT | (7l + 1)te1 + te2
PartialDec CTp 2|GT | (4|S|+ 1)tp + |S| · te2
Dec1 – te1
Dec2 – 0tp + 0te1 + 0te2
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of one element in Zp. The computation overhead of PP is one bilinear pairing
operation.
2. InKeyGen.MI algorithm, the medical instituteMIi’s public key PKi consists
of two elements in group G, and MIi’s secret key SKi consists of four elements
in group G and one element in Zp. The computation overhead of PKi is two
exponentiation calculations in group G and that of SKi is five exponentiation
calculations in group G.
3. In KeyGen.User algorithm, the user’s attribute secret key SKi,j consists of
|S|+ 3 elements in group G with computation overhead 3|S|+ 3 exponentiation
calculations in group G.
4. In KeyGen.Del algorithm, the delegation key DKi,j consists of |S| + 4 ele-
ments in group G with computation overhead |S|+4 exponentiation calculations
in group G.
5. In KeyGen.BGK algorithm, the auxiliary break-glass key messages BGKi,j,1
and BGKi,j,2 all have three elements in group G and one element in group GT .
The total computation overhead is five exponentiation calculations in group G.
6. In Extract.BGK algorithm, the computation overhead has five exponentiation
calculations in group G. No storage overhead is required in this algorithm.
7. In Enc algorithm, the storage overhead of the ciphertext CT , the proof message
pf and the transformation key TKi,j are (4l + 1)|G|+ |GT |, 3|G|+ 3|Zp| and
|G|, respectively. The computation overhead of them are (6l + 1)te1 + te2 , te1
and 7te1 , respectively.
8. In V alidityTest algorithm, the computation overhead is five exponentiation cal-
culations in group G. No storage overhead is required in this algorithm.
9. In MsgText algorithm, the computation overhead is two bilinear pairing opera-
tions and no storage overhead is required in this algorithm.
10. InReEnc algorithm, the re-encrypted ciphertextCT ′ consists of 4l+1 elements
in group G and one element in group GT , with computation overhead (7l +
1)te1 + te2 .
11. In Partial algorithm, the partial ciphertext CTp consists of two elements in
group GT , with computation overhead (4|S|+ 1)tp + |S| · te2 .
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12. In Dec1 algorithm, the computation overhead is one exponentiation calculations
in group G. No storage overhead is required in this algorithm.
13. In Dec2 algorithm, no bilinear pairing or exponentiation calculation is required.
No storage overhead is required in this algorithm.
7.2. Experimental Analysis
The proposed secure storage system is implemented using the Stanford Pairing
Based Cryptography (PBC) library [5], which is a free C library to operate the math-
ematical calculations underlying the pairing based crypto systems. We use PBC-0.4.7
and Visual Studio 2012 in our implementation. The simulations are conducted on a
notebook computer with Intel CoreTM i3-2120 CPU @ 3.3 GHz, 4.00 GB RAM run-
ning 64-bit Windows 7 operation system.
The proposed cross-domain medical data cloud storage system, together with break-
glass access control and secure deduplication, can be simulated over the type A elliptic
curve with the expression E : y2 = x3 +x. The group parameters are |G| = 1024 bits,
|GT | = 1024 bits and |Zp| = 160 bits. Except for our system, we also implement the
schemes in [11, 31, 15, 22] to make a comparison.
Table 6: Simulation of Public Parameter Size (KB)
Ours [11] [31] [15] [22]
0.640 0.768 0.128 0.512 0.768
Tables 6-8 and Figures 8-9 show the storage overhead of our system and the schemes
in [11, 31, 15, 22], which includes the public parameter size, user’s attribute secret key
size and ciphertext size in KB.
• The public parameter sizes |PP | of these schemes are constant, which are shown
in Table 6. In our system, the public parameter is 0.64 KB, which is smaller than
that in [11, 22] and larger than that in [31, 15].
• Table 7 and Figure 8 show the simulation result of the attribute secret key size.
It is easy to find that our system has the best performance among these schemes.
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Table 7: Simulation of Attribute Secret key Size (KB)
|S| Ours [11] [31] [15] [22]
1 0.512 0.512 0.384 0.896 0.640
10 1.664 2.816 3.840 2.048 5.248
20 2.944 5.376 7.680 3.328 10.368
30 4.224 7.936 11.520 4.608 15.488
40 5.504 10.496 15.360 5.888 20.608
50 6.784 13.056 19.200 7.168 25.728
60 8.064 15.616 23.040 8.448 30.848
70 9.344 18.176 26.880 9.728 35.968
80 10.624 20.736 30.720 11.008 41.088
90 11.904 23.296 34.560 12.288 46.208
100 13.184 25.856 38.400 13.568 51.328




















Figure 8: Simulation of Attribute Secret Key Size (KB)
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Table 8: Simulation of Ciphertext Size (KB)
l Ours [11] [31] [15] [22]
1 0.768 0.64 0.896 0.896 0.896
10 5.376 4.096 6.656 6.656 6.656
20 10.496 7.936 13.056 13.056 13.056
30 15.616 11.776 19.456 19.456 19.456
40 20.736 15.616 25.856 25.856 25.856
50 25.856 19.456 32.256 32.256 32.256
60 30.976 23.296 38.656 38.656 38.656
70 36.096 27.136 45.056 45.056 45.056
80 41.216 30.976 51.456 51.456 51.456
90 46.336 34.816 57.856 57.856 57.856
100 51.456 38.656 64.256 64.256 64.256





















Figure 9: Simulation of Ciphertext Size (KB)
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The scheme in [22] has the worst performance, and the schemes in [11, 31, 15]
are at the medium level. When the size of the attribute set is 10, the |SKi,j | =
1.664 KB in our system and |SKi,j | = 5.248 KB in scheme [22]. When the
size of the attribute set is 100, the |SKi,j | = 13.184 KB in our system, and
|SKi,j | = 51.328 KB in scheme [22], which is three times of that in our system.
• Table 8 and Figure 9 show the simulation result of the ciphertext size. It seems
that there are only three lines for five schemes. In fact, the schemes in [31, 15, 22]
have the same performance and the lines representing these schemes overlap.
The performance of the ciphertext size of our system is at the medium level.
When the row number l of matrix A is 10, the ciphertext size |CT | = 5.376
KB in our system, |CT | = 4.096 KB in scheme [11], and |CT | = 6.646 KB
in schemes [31, 15, 22]. When l = 100, the ciphertext size |CT | = 51.456 KB
in our system, |CT | = 38.656 KB in scheme [11], and |CT | = 64.256 KB in
schemes [31, 15, 22].
Tables 9-11 and Figures 10-12 show the calculation cost of our system and the
schemes in [11, 31, 15, 22], which include the key generation time for user’s attribute
secret key, encryption time and decryption time using attribute secret key.
• Table 9 and Figure 10 show the execution time of the KeyGen.User algorithm.
The performance of KeyGen.User algorithm of our system is better than that
in schemes [11, 31, 22] but worse than that in scheme [15]. The lines of the
schemes [11, 31] are quite close. When the size of the attribute set is 10, the
KeyGen.User algorithm’s execution time has 0.394 s, 0.397 s, 0.174 s, 0.468
s and 0.354 s in schemes [11, 31, 15, 22] and our system, respectively. When
the size of the attribute set is 100, theKeyGen.User algorithm’s execution time
has 3.695 s, 3.668 s, 0.989 s, 4.594 s and 2.708 s in schemes [11, 31, 15, 22] and
our system, respectively.
• Table 10 and Figure 11 show the execution time of the Enc algorithm. The
performance of Enc algorithm of our system is better than that in schemes [31,
15] but worse than that in scheme [11, 22]. The lines of the schemes [11, 22]
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are quite close. When the row number l of matrix A is 10, the Enc algorithm’s
execution time has 0.498 s, 0.642 s, 0.756 s, 0.479 s and 0.562 s in schemes
[11, 31, 15, 22] and our system, respectively. When l = 100, the Enc algorithm
execution times are 4.624 s, 6.418 s, 7.563 s, 4.505 s and 5.513 s in schemes
[11, 31, 15, 22] and our system, respectively.
• Table 11 and Figure 12 show the execution time of the Dec1 algorithm. The per-
formance ofDec1 algorithm of our system is much better than the other schemes
and the execution time remains constant with approximately 0.009 s. When the
size of the attribute set is 10, the Dec1 algorithm’s execution times has 0.559 s,
0.911 s, 1.353 s and 0.742 s in schemes [11, 31, 15, 22], respectively. When the
size of the attribute set is 100, the Dec1 algorithm’s execution time has 5.426 s,
9.107 s, 11.333 s and 7.231 s respectively in schemes [11, 31, 15, 22].
Table 9: Execution time of KeyGen.User algorithm (s)
|S| Ours [11] [31] [15] [22]
1 0.055 0.064 0.037 0.092 0.055
10 0.354 0.394 0.397 0.174 0.468
20 0.528 0.791 0.694 0.286 0.986
30 0.853 1.108 1.100 0.338 1.325
40 1.178 1.555 1.467 0.449 1.843
50 1.373 1.801 1.834 0.581 2.371
60 1.678 2.228 2.161 0.603 2.703
70 1.993 2.595 2.567 0.724 3.218
80 2.188 2.902 2.934 0.816 3.727
90 2.503 3.388 3.301 0.938 4.085
100 2.708 3.695 3.668 0.989 4.594
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Figure 10: Execution time of KeyGen.User algorithm (s)
Table 10: Execution time of Enc algorithm (s)
|S| Ours [11] [31] [15] [22]
1 0.067 0.085 0.064 0.076 0.066
10 0.562 0.498 0.642 0.756 0.479
20 1.192 0.956 1.484 1.713 0.838
30 1.662 1.415 1.925 2.269 1.396
40 2.212 1.973 2.767 3.225 1.754
50 2.629 2.332 3.209 3.781 2.313
60 3.313 2.790 3.851 4.338 2.671
70 3.993 3.348 4.693 5.294 3.230
80 4.413 3.707 5.135 6.252 3.588
90 4.803 4.265 5.576 6.706 4.147
100 5.513 4.624 6.418 7.563 4.505
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Figure 11: Execution time of Enc algorithm (s)
Table 11: Execution time of Dec1 algorithm (s)
|S| Ours [11] [31] [15] [22]
1 0.009 0.072 0.091 0.113 0.093
10 0.009 0.559 0.911 1.353 0.742
20 0.009 1.215 1.821 2.267 1.463
30 0.008 1.582 2.952 3.751 2.314
40 0.009 2.181 3.643 4.533 2.905
50 0.009 2.862 4.233 5.357 3.786
60 0.009 3.263 5.464 6.801 4.217
70 0.008 3.724 6.635 8.233 5.068
80 0.009 4.345 7.285 9.066 5.959
90 0.009 4.701 8.006 10.002 6.386
100 0.009 5.426 9.107 11.333 7.231
51





















Figure 12: Execution time of Dec1 algorithm (s)
8. Conclusion
We designed an IoT-based cross-domain medical file cloud storage system with
break-glass access control and secure deduplication to facilitate the data management
in electronic healthcare system. The secure deduplication demonstrated by our paper
can enable (1) the public cloud to distinguish the ciphertexts with the same medical
message; and (2) the private cloud of the medical institute to re-encrypt the ciphertext
with a combined access policy , so that all the original authorized data users are capable
to access to the new ciphertext. Moreover, this system is the first one to provide two
suits of access control mechanisms for the medical applications: cross-domain attribute
based access in normal situations and password-based break-glass access in emergency
situations. These two mechanisms ensure not only the security of patients’ encrypted
medical files, but they also provide immediate emergency data access to save patients’
lives. Compared with other related projects, this system is validated to be secure. The
simulation results indicate that this system is efficient and practical.
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